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Abstract
In mobile teamwork environments two basic problems
exist: how to discover someone based on a profile (skills,
reputations) and how to assess that person’s “credibility”
(trust). A lot of work has been done on the issues of collect-
ing and spreading reputations and subsequent computation
of trust. The application of such data for decision making,
however, is still missing. In this paper we present a solution
for scheduling exchanges among participants of an online
community which take into account their trustworthiness.
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1. Introduction - Reputation and Trust
Rapid growth of the Internet has made it possible for
any computer around the globe to participate in a collab-
orative (e-commerce, teamwork, etc.) scenario. Frequently,
parties working together know nothing about the “quality”
of their communication partners (e.g., how much they can
trust them). In the following discussion we focus on the
issue of trust as one concrete quality in such scenarios. If
“strangers” are to collaborate reputation reporting and trust
assessment mechanisms play a crucial role for proper func-
tioning of those collaborations ([1]).
Numerous works on reputations and trust management in
online communities have appeared recently. In our opinion,
an inter-disciplinary approach taking into account works on
the trust issues from the areas of sociology, psychology, and
economics is needed here. Figure 1 shows the common ref-
erence model that most approaches apply. The reputation
management module collects information about the past be-
havior of the members of the community under considera-
tion as well as makes this information available for others
to use. Once the data about past interactions of potential
partners has been collected, the trust management module
comes into play and calculates predictions of their future
behavior. Finally, the decision making module, analysing
the performance of those predictions in the interaction that
is about to happen and having the risk averseness related in-
puts from the user, makes the decision whether to interact
or not. The results of the interactions are then fed back into
the reputation management module for the future use.
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Figure 1. Reputation and trust management
reference model
At the moment research focuses on how to organize rep-
utation reporting and, subsequently, compute the trustwor-
thiness of potential partners. But, the question how to use
trust data to select optimal strategies in interactions is not
addressed. In a typical example of exchanges of goods
for money, a seller may require an insufficiently trustwor-
thy buyer to deliver the payment before the delivery of the
goods. On the other hand, this may be unacceptable to the
buyer because of the seller’s bad reputation and the buyer
may as well require the seller to deliver the goods before the
money is delivered. In most cases the reputation records of
the two partners will suggest, however, that it is not neces-
sary to go into these two extremes and that the deliveries of
the goods and the payments can be arranged in such a way
that the partners’ expectations are met with high probability.
For this purpose a closer analysis of the quality of the ex-
change strategies with respect to the trustworthiness of the
partners is needed. This is where our approach comes into
play. It represents a trust-related decision making scheme
that can be used in many collaboration scenarios.
2. The Setting - Safe Exchange
[4] presents the basis for our work. We consider ex-
changes between two participants in an e-commerce sce-
nario. We assume that one of the two participants (the “sup-
plier”) is selling a set of “goods” to the other partner (the
“consumer”). We further assume that they agreed about the
overall price the consumer will have to pay for the goods
(P ) as well as that the consumer may deliver the payments
in arbitrarily sized chunks. The set of goods consists of a
number of items and it is assumed that the supplier’s value
function Vs(x), describing the supplier’s cost for generating
and delivering any item x of the goods, as well as the con-
sumer’s value function Vc(x), describing what the good x
is worth to the consumer are both known to both partners.
The problem can be now stated as follows: how to com-
bine the deliveries of the goods and the payments in a way
such that, at any point during the exchange, future gains of
both partners are greater than their gains from instant defec-
tion. With such an exchange strategy the partners have no
rational incentive to break the exchange at any point before
its end. Therefore, an exchange sequence that meets these
conditions is called safe (exchange) sequence.
[4] defines general conditions for the existence of a safe
exchange sequence. They are expressed as requirement that
states that the current utilities of the two partners lie be-
tween two bounds, Pmin and Pmax, that are functions of
Vs(x), Vc(x) and P . It is shown that in isolated exchanges
a safe sequence cannot exist whereby reputation effects are
suggested as a mechanism that may enable the existence of
a safe exchange. In this case a quadratic time algorithm that
finds a safe sequence, if one exists, is provided.
3. Trust Aware Safe Exchange
The results described in the previous section can be ap-
plied in many different settings. The necessary condition
for the applicability of the approach is that the good being
sold is divisible into a set of chunks whereby the valuations
of these chunks are known to the both partners. This condi-
tion can be met in many practical situations such as trades
in eBay’s auctions, exchanges of MP3 files for money in
a P2P system or trades of services in a teamwork environ-
ment. But, a serious practical problem associated with the
original approach is that a fully safe exchange sequence for
the deliveries of the chunks of goods and the payments may
not exist in many cases. Assuming that interactions in the
mentioned systems are backed by underlying reputation and
trust management models, a trust aware extension of the
above results is required as it may help schedule exchanges
between (sufficiently) honest partners in these cases.
Every set of goods that the supplier wants to sell to the
consumer and their valuations, Vs(x) and Vc(x), have asso-
ciated gains for the two partners. If the exchange can be car-
ried out in the safe manner these gains are guaranteed, but,
in situations when a fully safe exchange sequence does not
exist (due to the mentioned valuations) these gains cannot
be achieved. Yet, if their opponents are sufficiently trust-
worthy, the partners can accept even unsafe exchanges. But
in this case an adaptation of the original approach that takes
into account the expectations of the two partners is needed.
Therefore, we proceed in the following way: We assume
that the two parties can compute probabilistic estimates of
a specific (in the simplest case honest and dishonest) be-
havior of the other side. This is the task of the underly-
ing trust computation module. [3] presents a theoretically
well-founded solution for this problem. [2] is a practical
approach that can be used in P2P environments. Now, we
expect the partners to refine their expectations from the ex-
change by decreasing the expected gains. The question of
how much to decrease the expected gains is left to the part-
ners themselves. Obviously, these decreases will be based
on the risk averseness of the two parties and the trustwor-
thiness of the other side. Without elaborating further on
that, note that these expectations easily translate into two
bounds representing the values that the partners accept to
be indebted. Finally, having these new, decreased, expected
gains we provide a provably correct quadratic-time algo-
rithm that finds an exchange sequence, if one exists, that
satisfies these expectations.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we propose a trust-aware mechanism for
scheduling exchanges of goods for money. It is based on
the risk averseness related inputs from the two exchange
partners. The main contribution of the work is that it pro-
vides the theoretical foundations that enables sufficiently
trustworthy partners carry out exchanges in cases when they
cannot proceed in a completely safe manner. Future work
will consider a game-theoretic extension of this work aris-
ing when the partners are interested in maximizing their
gains from the exchanges.
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